black



his eyes.
Where are they going? Where is Jackson placing them?
It was possible, of course, that Jackson simply intended to fit them somewhere into the forces already in position at the Rodriguez Canal.
But Ross didn't think so. The fieldworks at the canal covered little more than half a mile of front, and by now Jackson had thousands of soldiers available. Not the fifteen thousand Keane had feared, no, but both Ross and Pakenham were sure that Jackson had amassed at least five thousand men on that line— and plenty of artillery with them.
Driscol's unit would just be an encumbrance there. His men, still poorly trained, were more likely to get in the way of other units than do much good.
So where else?
Fort St. John was a possibility. Quite a good one, actually. If Jackson had the usual American distrust of the capabilities of black men as combatants—unlike the British, who had many black units in uniform—he might very well decide the fort on Lake Pontchartrain was the best place to put them.
Except...
With anyone other than Driscol in command, Fort St. John probably was where Jackson would put them. But Driscol was in command. Jackson wouldn't have had the success he'd had as a general—not leading mostly militia forces, certainly—if he wasn't a good judge of an officer's caliber as a combat leader. By now, Ross would give very long odds that Jackson had sized up Driscol and come to the same conclusion that Ross had.
And I'd have put that man in charge of whatever unit might come under the fiercest blows, on any battlefield in my life.
He opened his eyes. The ceiling was a blank, cold, empty bitterness.
Jackson was moving Driscol and his freedmen battalion across the river. With their ordnance. Ross was well-nigh certain of it. Just as he was almost certain that Jackson would have made plans to reinforce them, if necessary. As had happened so many times before, the British had almost caught Jackson napping.
But not quite in time.
Robert Ross sighed. On a battlefield, "almost" was more deadly than grapeshot. Nine battles out of ten were won or lost because something